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YES, THE PTAB IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
GREGORY DOLIN, M.D. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, Congress enacted a major overhaul of the patent laws. While 
the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA)1 includes some significant, if 
controversial provisions, perhaps the best-known ones are the several admin-
istrative processes to review and potentially cancel already issued patents.2 
These new post-issuance reviews, specifically the inter partes review (IPR) 
have engendered a fair amount of debate in the courts,3 academia,4 and Con-
gress5 with focus being primarily on the procedures used by Patent Trial and 
Appeals Board (PTAB)––the newly created adjudicative body within the Pa-
tent and Trademark Office, the results of these trials, and the fairness to the 
patentees and the challengers.6 There is, however, a more fundamental prob-
lem with the PTAB run-post issuance proceedings, one that cannot be cured 
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 1.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified in 
scattered Sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 2.  See Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 498–99 
(2012). 
 3.  See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2134 (2016); Aqua Prods., Inc. 
v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy 
Grp., LLC, 639 F. App’x. 639 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017); MCM Portfolio 
LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016); Versata 
Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
 4.  See, e.g., Greg Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Cancellation, 23 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 377 (2017); Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)Valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271 (2016); 
John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO As Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657 (2016); Greg-
ory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719 (2016); Gregory Dolin, Du-
bious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 881 (2015); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent 
Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013); Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 633 (2012). 
 5.  See, e.g., Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience 
(STRONGER) Patents Act of 2017, S. 1390, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017); Protecting American Talent 
and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act of 2015, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Patent Quality 
Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).  
 6.  See supra notes 3–5. 
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by fine-tuning particular processes. The Supreme Court now has before it a 
case that will consider whether reposing a power to annul vested private 
property rights in an administrative agency runs afoul of the Constitution’s 
Article III requirements.7 In this Article, I will lay out a case for why that 
question should be answered in the negative.8 In other words, whether the 
post-issuance proceedings can or do achieve the Congressional purposes of 
reducing patent litigation costs, providing more certainty, and improve pa-
tent quality9 is beside the point if the tribunals vested with the review powers 
are themselves unconstitutional. The best reading of the Constitutional text, 
precedent, and history supports the conclusion that non-judicial abrogation 
of vested patent rights does in fact run afoul of the constitutional strictures. 
This conclusion is based on the precedents related to both invention patents 
and land patents coupled with the original understanding of the Constitu-
tional separation of powers doctrine, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on the Article III–imposed constraints. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I will discuss the nature of 
patents as private property, the judicial treatment patents as on par with prop-
erty land, and the mechanism for error correction that have existed in light 
of these principles. This Part will conclude with an argument as to why pa-
tents are not merely private property, but private, rather than public, rights. 
Part II will focus on the constitutional requirements for adjudicating private 
rights and will reconcile these requirements with ex parte reexamination—
an error correction mechanism that has existed since 1981. In Part III, I will 
show that the IPRs do not and cannot live up to the goals and purposes of 
Article III, and indeed often are an antithesis of those goals. Finally, Part IV 
will offer some suggestions on bringing the system in line with the constitu-
tional requirements. The Conclusion offers some final observations. 
I. PATENTS AS PRIVATE PROPERTY 
A. The Treatment of Patents in the Early Republic 
As Chief Justice Roberts noted “[in patent law], as other[] [areas], “a 
page of history is worth a volume of logic.”10 The examination of the history 
of the American patent system yields an unsurprising result. From the early 
 
 7.  Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017). 
 8.  This Article draws heavily on a brief I co-authored in the pending Oil States case. See Brief for 
Cato Institute and American Conservative Union Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Oil 
States, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (No. 16-1712), 2017 WL 3888212. 
 9.  See Dolin & Manta, supra note 4, at 721–22 (describing goals of the AIA). 
 10.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). 
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days of the Republic and to the present day, a long line of cases reaffirmed, 
time and again, that patents for inventions are private property and stand on 
the same constitutional footing as land.11 This basic understanding has per-
sisted irrespective of the method for obtaining or enforcing patents. This un-
derstanding stemmed not merely from a particular statutory provision, but 
from the Constitution itself. Chief Justice Marshall explained that 
 
The constitution and law, taken together, give to the 
inventor, from the moment of invention, an inchoate prop-
erty therein, which is completed by suing out a patent. This 
inchoate right is exclusive. It can be invaded or impaired by 
no person. No person can, without the consent of the inven-
tor, acquire a property in the invention . . . . [T]his inchoate 
and indefeasible property in the thing discovered com-
mences with the discovery itself, and is only perfected by 
the patent subjecting the future use of the machine con-
structed previous to a patent . . . .12 
 
It should be acknowledged that the Chief Justice was careful to note 
that the exclusivity that comes along with a patent is a creature of congres-
sionally enacted legislation.13 At the same time, the passage is remarkable 
for the recognition that the invention itself brings with it a property right, 
albeit not an exclusive one, and that that right is conferred not by the gov-
ernment. In other words, the courts had no trouble concluding that inventors 
have a pre-existing common law right to their invention which was neither 
enlarged nor diminished by the grant of a patent, but that that right was not 
exclusive absent a patent grant.14 In light of the influence of John Locke on 
 
 11.  See generally Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Pro-
tection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007) (reviewing historical evidence 
and concluding that from the early days of the Republic, patents have been treated as private property, 
and not merely governmental favors). 
 12.  Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (Marshall, Circuit Justice), aff’d, 13 U.S. 
199 (1815).  
 13.  Id. (noting that “the exclusive right to use [the invention] after the date of the patent, [is a right] 
which the act of congress [sic] confers”) (emphasis added).  
 14.  See, e.g., Patterson v. State of Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 507 (1878) (“The sole operation of the 
statute is to enable him to prevent others from using the products of his labors except with his consent. 
But his own right of using is not enlarged or affected. There remains in him, as in every other citizen, the 
power to manage his property, or give direction to his labors, at his pleasure . . . .”); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great 
Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to 
the inventors.”). 
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the Founders’ view of government and property,15 this underlying right was 
often anchored in the labor of the inventor.16 
The Lockean view of invention patents also meant that the early courts 
consistently applied the same rules to patents as to real property.17 The clear-
est example of this can be seen in McClurg v. Kingsland decided in 1843.18 
Addressing the effect of amendments to the Patent Act on the rights of those 
whose patents issued under the statute previously in force the McClurg Court 
held that the amendments “can have no effect to impair the right of property 
then existing in a patentee, or his assignee, according to the well-established 
principles of this court in 8 Wheat. 493.”19 The citation is noteworthy be-
cause the “well-established principles” which the Court referred to were 
drawn from a case that had nothing whatsoever to do with patents, but with 
land ownership.20 The “well-established principle” announced in that case 
was that legislatures cannot derogate from vested land titles21 and the same 
rule was applied to patents as well.22 In short, the courts of the early Republic 
saw no difference between land grants and invention patent grants.23 
This view of patents is particularly noteworthy given that between 1793 
and 1836 “patents [were] granted at the patent office, not after an examina-
tion into their merits, but upon ex parte statements” of the applicants.24 In 
 
 15.  See Adam Mossoff, Saving Locke from Marx: The Labor Theory of Value in Intellectual Prop-
erty Theory, 29 J. SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 283 (2012) (arguing that John Locke’s labor theory of value pro-
vides a justification for intellectual property rights); see also Joan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption Un-
locked, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1081, 1100 n.90 (noting that the argument that the framers’ approach to patents 
was “influenced by John Locke . . . is particularly persuasive given the strong parallels which can be 
drawn between the basic patent structure, Lockean precepts, and the history of the American system.”); 
see also David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 421, 426 
(1983) (“The framers of the Constitution were men to whom the right to hold property was enormously 
important. They were not far removed from Locke. His ideas pervaded their debates and decision.”). 
 16.  See Davoll v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Woodbury, Circuit J.) (“[T]he 
labors of the mind, productions and interests as much a man’s own, and as much the fruit of his honest 
industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks he rears.”). 
 17.  See Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2001, 2022 (2009) (“Throughout the nineteenth century, courts employed Lockean property 
theory to justify the protection of property rights, especially the new forms of intellectual property.”). 
 18.  42 U.S. 202 (1843). 
 19.  Id. at 206. 
 20.  See Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. 
464 (1823). 
 21.  Id. at 493. 
 22.  McClurg, 42 U.S. at 206. For a discussion of the case and its interaction with the law governing 
real property, see Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property, supra note 11, at 702–03. 
 23.  See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 11, at 700–11; see also Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 
92, 96 (1876) (“A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the 
same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.”); McCormick Harvesting 
Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co., 169 U.S. 606, 608–09 (1898) (holding that a patent, once signed and 
delivered, “become[s] the property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same legal protection as 
other property.”). 
 24.  Stanley v. Hewitt, 22 F. Cas. 1043, 1044 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1836). 
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other words, the patent office issued a patent upon mere demand for one, and 
without conducting an inquiry into the novelty of the invention sought to be 
patented. Yet, the courts, though often frustrated with patents that “would 
not be capable of sustaining a just claim for the exclusive privileges ac-
quired,”25 continued to recognize patents as property rights, and “construe 
these patents fairly and liberally, and not to subject them to any over-nice 
and critical refinements.”26 
B. Error Correction 
None of this is to say that the early patent system was free from error or 
that those who crafter and administered that system failed to recognize the 
possibility of such error. Quite the opposite. The framers knew that govern-
ment errors in administering government programs are as old as governments 
are themselves.27 The patent system was no different and left plenty of room 
for error, so much so that in 1809, the Superintendent of Patents himself 
concluded that “many of the patents are useless, except to give work to the 
lawyers, & others so useless in construction as to be . . . merely intended for 
sale.”28 The judges were no more enamored, writing that “[t]he most frivo-
lous and useless alterations in articles in common use are denominated im-
provements . . .” and receive patents.29 And the drafters of the Patent Acts 
were not so daft as to think that the Government can operate without error. 
In the very first Patent Act, Congress provided two avenues to challenge 
patent validity.30 First, although a patent served as prima facie evidence of 
the patentee’s rights to the things described,31 an accused infringer was per-
mitted to argue that the patent was invalid because it failed to properly spec-
ify the thing invented.32 If the defendant managed to overcome the presump-
tion of validity that attached to the patent, the court would be required to 
render judgment for the defendant.33 Such judgment for the defendant did 
not necessarily “cancel” the patent—it merely resolved a specific dispute 
 
 25.  John Redman Coxe, Of Patents, 1 EMPORIUM ARTS & SCI. 76, 76 (1812). 
 26.  Ames v. Howard, 1 F. Cas. 755, 756 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (Story, Circuit J.). 
 27.  See Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1634–35 
(1997); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (rejecting the idea that “the legislature 
will [] be infallible.”). 
 28.  Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855, 888 (1998) (quoting Letter from William Thornton, Superintendent, U.S. 
Pat. Office, to Amos Eaton (May 5, 1809)). 
 29.  Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1826). 
 30.  Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, §§ 5, 6, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).  
 31.  Id. at § 6. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  The defendant could also “plead the general issue,” i.e., argue that the patent was not infringed. 
Id. 
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between the patentee and a particular defendant.34 However, the 1790 Act 
also provided an avenue for outright patent cancellation.35 The Act permitted 
a challenge to be brought in a federal district court within a year after the 
patent was granted, and if the evidence that the patent was improperly ob-
tained were sufficient, the district judge was empowered “to repeal such pa-
tents.”36 
The Patent Act of 1793 took a similar approach. Given the switch to a 
patent registration system, a patent issued under the 1793 Act would no 
longer be prima facie evidence of any rights held by the patentee; rather, the 
matter of the patent scope and validity would be resolved at trial “in the cir-
cuit court of the United States, or any other court having competent jurisdic-
tion.”37 As before, at trial an accused infringer could argue that the patent 
was invalid because it failed to properly specify the thing invented, but in 
addition could also attempt to convince the court that the patent described 
things that were not “inventions” because they were not “not originally dis-
covered by the patentee, but had been in use, or had been described in some 
public work anterior to the supposed discovery.”38 If such a defense were 
successful, not only would a “judgment [] be rendered for the defendant,” 
but “the patent [would] be declared void.”39 At the same time, the Act pre-
served the ability of any person to file a suit in a district court for the cancel-
lation of the patent, even in the absence of an infringement suit.40 
The 1793 Act, though often viewed as authorizing mere rubber stamp-
ing of applications and converting them to full–blown patents,41 actually had 
some provisions for (admittedly very limited) administrative review.42 Under 
the Act, arbitrators decided competing claims of priority to the same inven-
tion.43 In light of elimination of examination process and the abolition of an 
 
 34.  See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 372 (1888); see also Mowry v. Whitney, 
81 U.S. 434, 441 (1871). 
 35.  Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (repealed 1836). The phrase “or any 
other court having competent jurisdiction” seems to imply that at least in the very early days of the Re-
public, state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction over patent suits. Congress clarified the issue 
when it passed the Patent Act of 1800 which omitted the aforementioned phrase, thus limiting patent 
litigation to the federal courts. See Donald S. Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and 
Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 635–36 (1971).  
 38.  Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 6. As before, the defendant could “plead the general 
issue,” i.e., non-infringement. Id.  
 39.  Id. 
 40.  The 1793 Act extended the period for cancellation from one year to three. Id. at § 10. 
 41.  See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the United States Came to Have 
A “First-to-Invent” Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 306 (1995). 
 42.  See Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 9. 
 43.  Id. 
    
2018 YES, THE PTAB IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL  463 
executive office responsible for making those determinations, creation of a 
process for settling these disputes was necessary. Although the 1793 Act 
made the judgment or the arbitrators “final,”44 the judgment extended only 
“as far as . . . the granting of the patent” to one of the competing applicants.45 
The patent could still be judicially cancelled upon petition to the district 
court.46 Thus, with respect to granted patents, Congress once again limited 
the power of cancellation due to errors in the granting process to Article III 
judges. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, the 1793 Act created a system where 
patents “issue[d] of course, subject to be declared void on such principles as 
should be established by the courts of law.”47 
The 1836 Act which brought with it the administrative system of pre–
grant patent examination, authorized the Commissioner of Patents to deny 
applications unless the invention described therein was indeed “new.”48 Sim-
ilarly, the Act allowed the Commissioner to adjudicate the priority rights be-
tween interfering patent applications or between a pending application and a 
previously issued patent.49 The Commissioner’s decisions on these matters 
were also subject to the appeal to the “board of examiners.”50 However, if 
the Commissioner decided that a pending application actually had priority of 
invention over an issued patent, he was not empowered to cancel the patent.51 
Instead, only a court of competent jurisdiction could adjudge that an issued 
patent is void and/or that the “applicant [of an interfering application] is [in-
stead] entitled . . . to have and receive a patent for his invention.”52 It was 
only after “such adjudication, if it be in favor of the right of such applicant,” 
 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. The system was not a particularly effective one, as applicants could refuse to participate in 
the process, or demand a patent (which the Patent Office was powerless to refuse) even after losing the 
arbitration. See Walterscheid, supra note 41, at 309–10.  
 46.  Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 10; Stearns v. Barrett, 22 F. Cas. 1175, 1182 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1816) (Story, Circuit J.) (“The sole object of such an award is, to ascertain who is prima facie 
entitled to the patent. But when once obtained, the patent is liable to be repealed or destroyed by precisely 
the same process, as if it had issued without objection.”). 
 47.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 336–37 (Andrew A. Lispcomb et al., eds.) (1903). In later years, Jefferson may 
have reconsidered his position and concluded that the “volumes of the law [offer not] a single ray which 
would lighten the path of the mechanic or mathematician.” Id. But the point is not whether the judges 
succeeded in developing useful rules, but that the drafters of the 1793 Act, much like the drafters of the 
1790 Act thought that once granted (on whatever terms), a patent could only “be declared void on such 
principles as should be established by the courts of law.” Id.  
 48.  Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (repealed 1952). 
 49.  Id. at § 8. 
 50.  Id. at §§ 7, 8. 
 51.  See Ewing v. U.S. ex rel. Fowler Car Co., 45 App. D.C. 185, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1916); see also 
Reilly, supra note 4, at 387. 
 52.  Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 16. 
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would the “Commissioner [be authorized] to issue [a] patent” to an interfer-
ing applicant.53 
Although “[t]he 1836 Patent Act did not include a specific private cause 
of action for . . . cancellation for fraud or inequitable conduct,”54 it continued 
to authorize defendants in patent suits to challenge patent validity as a de-
fense to any infringement action brought against them.55 If the defendant 
were to convince a court that the patent was indeed invalid, he would escape 
liability for infringement,56 but (and unlike the prior practice) the patent 
“would remain a valid instrument as to all others.”57 Additionally, the courts, 
as a matter of equity, remained able to cancel improperly issued patents, pro-
vided that the suit was brought by the United States itself rather than a private 
party.58 It “is notable . . . that in all [] circumstances in which a party (public 
or private) sought to annul or revoke a patent under the 1836 Act, that party 
had to proceed in equity.”59 And because equity power is vested solely in 
Article III tribunals and cannot be withdrawn from them by Congress,60 pa-
tent invalidation under the 1836 Act could be accomplished only through 
Article III judicial intervention. 
As Congress continued to refine the system with subsequent Patent 
Acts, it continued to strengthen the power of the Patent Office to separate 
applications worthy of a patent from those unworthy of the same. At the same 
time, Congress never wavered from leaving the adjudication of issued pa-
tents’ validity to the courts. 
Because the courts have consistently recognized that “[a] patent for an 
invention is as much property as a patent for land . . . [t]he right rests on the 
same foundation . . . surrounded and protected by the same sanctions,”61 it is 
worth examining how the courts dealt with mistakes in the grant of land pa-
tents. The Homestead Act62 was a near contemporary of the Patent Act of 
1836, being signed into law a mere quarter of a century later. The land pa-
tents received under the Homestead Act, are nearly a mirror image of patents 
received under the Patent Act. While the Homestead Act was in effect, set-
tlers found empty lots of land, worked the land for five years, and then filed 
 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1699 
(2013). 
 55.  See Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, §§ 12, 15. 
 56.  Id. at § 15. 
 57.  Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434, 441 (1871). 
 58.  Id.; United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 360 (1888). 
 59.  Lemley, supra note 54, at 1702. 
 60.  Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855). 
 61.  Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876). 
 62.  Act of May 20, 1862 (Homestead Act), ch. 75, §§ 1–2, 12 Stat. 392 (1862). 
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an application for a patent from the federal government.63 In other words, 
settlers found land that wasn’t known to others before, made it into new and 
useful farmland, and upon disclosure of their efforts received, pursuant to a 
statute, a document that allowed them to exclude all others from the land 
which the settlers made theirs. The process for obtaining a patent for inven-
tion under the 1836 Act (and subsequent legislation) was and is strikingly 
similar. An inventor discovers an idea not previously known to others, de-
velops that idea into a new and useful invention, and upon the disclosure of 
that invention, receives a document that allows him to exclude others from 
working his invention, pursuant to a statute.64 
The complaints about land patents mirrored the views that “[a] consid-
erable portion of all the patents granted [for inventions] are worthless and 
void.”65 Indeed, “[t]he head of the U.S. General Land Office, the agency 
which disbursed federal lands, estimated that in 1883 fraud accounted for 40 
percent of the 5-year homesteads,”66 which in turn caused much pressure to 
rescind or cancel these grants.67 And while there were attempts to simply 
cancel such grants administratively,68 the Supreme Court was clear that once 
 
The patent issued under the seal of the United States, 
and signed by the President, is delivered to and accepted by 
the party, the title of the government passes with this deliv-
ery. With the title passes away all authority or control of the 
Executive Department over the land, and over the title which 
it has conveyed.69 
 
The rule applied with equal force to patents that were issued following 
a mistake on law or fact, and even to patents obtained by outright fraud.70 
Such patents could only be cancelled as a result of “a direct proceeding in-
stituted by the government or by parties acting in its name and by its 
 
 63.  Id. at § 2; see also Getting to Know the Homestead Act, NAT’L PARK SVC., http://bit.ly/2w8dyz0 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
 64.  See Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102–03, 
111–14 (1952). 
 65. S. REP. NO. 24-239, at 2 (1836), available at http://perma.cc/HX7S-33GK. 
 66.  GEORGE DRAFFAN, TAKING BACK OUR LAND: A HISTORY OF RAILROAD LAND GRANT 
REFORM 3 (1998), http://www.landgrant.org/takingback.pdf.  
 67.  See generally id. (discussing political pressure to deal with improperly issued grants of land). 
 68.  See, e.g., United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880) (a mandamus petition was brought after 
the Commissioner of the General Land-Office refused to deliver and attempted to cancel a previously 
signed and sealed patent). 
 69.  Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533 (1877). 
 70.  Wright-Blodgett Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 397, 403 (1915). 
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authority.”71 Additionally, a private party whose interest clashed with the 
land patent could also sue and, upon proof that the government made a mis-
take, could seek an order from “a court of equity to correct the mistake and 
compel the transfer of the legal title to him as the true owner.”72 
The Court treated invention patents in exactly the same way, us-
ingnearly identical language. Thus, McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. 
Aultman73—an invention patent case—decided in 1898 nearly parroted the 
language of Moore v. Robbins74—a land patents cases—decided two decades 
earlier. The McCormick Court did not view it as controversial to observe that 
once “a patent has received the signature of the secretary of the interior, 
countersigned by the commissioner of patents, and has had affixed to it the 
seal of the patent office, it has passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of 
that office, and is not subject to be revoked or canceled by the president, or 
any other officer of the government.”75 
Some scholars and judges have cast doubt on the vitality or applicability 
of McCormick to the modern Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) practices 
arguing that it did not announce a constitutional rule but merely interpreted 
the then-existing Patent Act.76 However, such an argument ignores the 
McCormick Court’s reliance on U.S. v. Schurz.77 In that case, a settler de-
manded that a land patent, which had been signed and sealed, be delivered 
to him.78 The Secretary of the Interior instead ordered them cancelled.79 
When sued in mandamus, the Secretary argued that in deciding whether to 
deliver the patent he 
 
was called upon to exercise a judgment and discretion 
on the case presented to him which were not merely minis-
terial, but which were rather judicial in their character, and 
in regard to which many matters were to be considered,—
 
 71.  Lee v. Johnson, 116 U.S. 48, 49 (1885). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  169 U.S. 606 (1898). 
 74.  96 U.S. 530 (1877). 
 75.  169 U.S. at 608. Compare id., with 96 U.S. at 533 (When “the patent [is] issued under the seal 
of the United States, and signed by the President, is delivered to and accepted by the party, the title of the 
government passes with this delivery. With the title passes away all authority or control of the Executive 
Department over the land, and over the title which it has conveyed. . . . [T]here is no place for the further 
control of the Executive Department over the title. The functions of that department necessarily cease 
when the title has passed from the government.”). 
 76.  See Reilly, supra note 4, at 393–94; see also MCM Portfolio, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 
F.3d 1284,1288–91. (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 77.  United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 378 (1880). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id.  
    
2018 YES, THE PTAB IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL  467 
such as the validity of the title conferred by the patent, the 
circumstances under which it was signed, sealed, and rec-
orded, and the conflicting rights of other parties to the lands 
covered by it.80 
 
According to the Secretary, the “execution of the patent concluded 
nothing, and the authority of the Secretary . . . to deal with the whole sub-
ject . . . remained unaffected by the patent.”81 Although the Supreme Court 
began its analysis of the Secretary’s argument by an observation that its 
soundness “must depend upon the authority conferred by Congress”82 on the 
Secretary, the opinion itself analyzed no statutory law,83 but instead relied 
on English common law as explicated by Blackstone.84 The Court’s reliance 
on English common law, as well as “all [other] nations, as far as we know”85 
would be rather peculiar if all it was doing was deciding upon the scope of 
the statutory limits upon the Secretary’s powers. A much more likely con-
clusion was that the Court was addressing a constitutional requirement that 
once something has become an individual’s private property, the instrument 
upon which such claim rests, may be voided “not by arbitrarily 
WITHHOLDING IT, but by judicial proceedings to set it aside, or correct it 
if only partly wrong.”86 The Court ultimately held that once a land patent is 
signed and sealed, the title has vested in the patentee and the executive 
branch can do nothing to divest him of such title though it may have doubts 
about the propriety of the initial grant of the patent.87 The only avenue of 
setting such a patent aside would be by a suit in equity,88 adjudication of 
which is necessarily reserved to the courts.89 Given the citation to Schurz, 
 
 80.  Id. at 395. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  The Court did discuss the statute insofar as it authorized Executive Branch officials to initially 
dispose of the federal lands and their authority to adjudicate various claims to the same. Id. at 395–96. 
Conspicuously though, the Court nowhere mentioned that the reason the Secretary of the Interior was not 
empowered to cancel an already issued patent was for want of explicit statutory authorization of such a 
power. Instead, the Court focused on the nature of the right in the claimant once the patent has issued, 
concluding that in those circumstances “the title to the lands has passed from the government [and] the 
question as to the real ownership of them is open in the proper courts to all the considerations appropriate 
to the case.” Id. at 396 (emphasis added). 
 84.  Id. at 397–98. 
 85.  Id. at 402. 
 86.  Id. at 401–02 (capitalization in the original). 
 87.  Id. at 397, 400–02.  
 88.  Id. at 404 (“[W]hen [a claimant] obtains this possession [via an issued patent], if there be any 
equitable reason why, as against the government, he should not have it,—if it has been issued without 
authority of law, or by mistake of facts, or by fraud of the grantee,—the United States can, by a bill in 
chancery, have a decree annulling the patent, or possibly a writ of scire facias.”). 
 89.  Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855). 
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and the nature of that case, it is more likely that McCormick was decided not 
only on statutory grounds. 
The only 19th-century precedent that potentially stands athwart this un-
derstanding is Morgan v. Daniels,90 decided in 1894. In that case, the Su-
preme Court held that the Commissioner of Patents’ determination on the 
question of who is the “true” first inventor is conclusive “unless the contrary 
is established by testimony which in character and amount carries thorough 
conviction.”91 This has been taken by some to mean that the Patent Office 
could, in an interference proceeding, administratively cancel a patent issued 
to one party and transfer it to another.92 Except that no case appears to hold 
that.93 Indeed, the only authority relied on for support of that proposition is 
Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.—a case where 
in litigation between two interfering patents, the District Court relied for the 
part of its conclusion on the interference proceedings in the Patent Office.94 
That case, however, cannot withstand the weight assigned to it. 
Victor Talking had a somewhat convoluted litigation history. It began 
when the Patent Office issued a patent relating “to a talking machine with 
the mechanical parts enclosed in a cabinet”95 to one Johnson.96 Thereafter, 
Browning filed a patent application covering the same invention.97 In an in-
terference proceeding, the Commissioner decided the interference in favor 
of Johnson, the senior party.98 On an appeal by Browning, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia (itself an Article III tribunal) reversed and 
found that Browning was the first inventor with Johnson deriving his inven-
tion from Browning.99 It is at this point though that a noteworthy event oc-
curred. Complying with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Patent Of-
fice issued a patent to Browning.100 However, it took no action against 
Johnson’s earlier patent, which resulted in two interfering patents.101 The as-
signors of the two interfering patents then engaged in further litigation over 
 
 90.  153 U.S. 120 (1894). 
 91.  Id. at 125. 
 92.  See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 4, at 394. 
 93.  Morgan involved a suit stemming from the Patent Office’s adjudication of interfering applica-
tions. 153 U.S. at 120. In resolving this dispute, the Court didn’t deviate from the rule laid down in land 
patent cases. Id. at 124–25 (citing Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. 72, 86 (1871)). 
 94.  290 F. 565 (D. Del. 1923), aff’d, 8 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1925), aff’d sub nom. Victor Talking Mach 
Co v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 273 U.S. 670 (1927). 
 95.  Browning v. Johnson, 271 F. 1017, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1921).  
 96.  U.S. Patent No. 946,442 (issued Jan. 11, 1910). 
 97.  271 F. at 1017–18; see also Victor Talking, 290 F. at 572. 
 98.  290 F. at 572. 
 99.  Browning, 271 F. at 1019. 
 100.  U.S. Patent No. 1,402,738 (issued Jan. 10, 1922). 
 101.  Victor Talking, 290 F. at 565. 
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their rights.102 In adjudicating the Victor Talking matter, the District Court 
explained that while the Commissioner may adjudicate the issues of priority, 
it does not affect issued patents directly,103 but may be used as evidence to 
later invalidate them in a suit at equity.104 The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia was to be treated the same way due to the 
limited nature of appeal to that court from adverse interferences decisions.105 
Because of these limitations on the Patent Office, it was left to the District 
Court, sitting in equity, to enter a final order invalidating Johnson’s patent.106 
On closer inspection then, Victor Talking is an entirely unremarkable case. 
Though the District Court deferred to the Patent Office’s (and Court of Ap-
peal’s) fact-finding, it still was open to new evidence and at the end of the 
day evaluated all of the evidence prior to arriving at the conclusion that the 
earlier judgment ought not be disturbed.107 Nothing in Victor Talking serves 
to undermine the conclusion that in the 19th century the courts viewed issued 
patents as indistinguishable from other forms of property and required that 
any doubts about their validity be resolved in properly constituted Article III 
tribunals. 
C. Patents as Private Rights 
Admittedly, the 19th century precedents cannot fully resolve the ques-
tion of PTAB’s constitutionality. Although the Patent Office (along with 
other agencies existing in the 1800s) were certainly “administrative agen-
cies,”108 the administrative state as presently understood did not fully blos-
som until mid-20th century.109 With the development of the administrative 
state and the proliferation of various agencies with power to adjudicate all 
sorts of disputes, a new legal framework came into being.110 The Supreme 
Court began to draw a distinction between the type of rights that could be 
adjudicated in tribunals other than Article III courts, and the rights for which 
 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 575 (noting that the Court of Appeals, like the Patent Office, “had before it only the 
question of priority of invention and matters subordinate and pertinent thereto. This court is not so re-
stricted. It may determine whether either of the patents is void on any ground.”). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 568–59 (quoting Johnson v. Mueser, 212 U.S. 283, 284 (1909)). 
 106.  Id. at 575. The District Court also invalidated, under the equitable doctrine of laches, Brown-
ing’s interfering claim. Id. 
 107.  Id. at 572–74. 
 108.  See Michael J. Pender, Judicial Review of PTO Patentability: Determinations Under the Sub-
stantial Evidence Standard of Review, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 431, 434 n.17 (2000). 
 109.  See Peter E. Quint, What Is A Twentieth-Century Constitution?, 67 MD. L. REV. 238, 246 
(2007). 
 110.  Id. (“When the ‘administrative state’ began its impressive rise . . . [it] relied . . . on a prolifera-
tion of statutory solutions.”). 
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no substitute to an Article III tribunal would do.111 The former are known as 
“public rights,” while the latter are “private rights.”112 Unfortunately, both 
the nomenclature and the jurisprudence underlying the distinction is not, by 
the Court’s own admission, a model of clarity.113 Nonetheless, some lines 
(albeit not incontestable) could be drawn. 
 Generally speaking, a right is classified as “private” when it “encom-
passes the type of property that is treated as compensable under the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment if taken.”114 On the other hand, a right is 
“public” when “the deprivation . . . would trigger [only] procedural due pro-
cess protections.”115 As other commentators and I have argued, patents are 
(and have always been) subject to the Takings Clause protections.116 Courts 
have recognized this requirement for over 100 years.117 Thus in Cammeyer 
v. Newton, the Court held that “the government cannot, after the patent is 
issued, make use of the improvement any more than a private individual, 
without license of the inventor or making him compensation.” Nor has the 
Court retreated from this position in recent years. Just two terms ago, the 
Court in Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture reaffirmed that personal property, 
including patents, is constitutionally no different than real property.118 And 
while it is true that merely investing some right with attributes of property 
does not make that right “private,”119 for many such rights (e.g., EPA li-
censes, welfare payments, government employment, and the like) are 
 
 111.  See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 318 U.S. 163 (1943); see also NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); see 
also Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929). 
 112.  See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50–51. 
 113.  See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1964–68 (2015) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (discussing the confusion in the doctrine); see also Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication and Judi-
cial Nondelegation: An Article III Canon, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1569, 1584 (2013) (“Any candid discussion 
of th[e] subject [of public and private rights] must acknowledge at the outset that the cases on Article III 
and the public–private line are a confusing morass.”). 
 114.  Sohoni, supra note 113, at 1156. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See Dolin & Manta, supra note 4, at 772–80; see also Mossoff, Constitutional Private Property, 
supra note 11, at 700–11; see also Joshua I. Miller, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(A) and the Unconstitutional Taking 
of Patents, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 18 (2010–2011). 
 117.  See, e.g., James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882) (A patent “confers upon the patentee 
an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government 
itself, without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation land 
which has been patented to a private purchaser.”). 
 118.  Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 
356 (1882)). 
 119.  See Sohoni, supra note 113, at 1156. 
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protected only by the Due Process Clause,120 patent rights, being protectable 
under the Takings Clause121 do fit within the “private” rights silo.122 
On the other hand, the Takings Clause analysis is not the only one the 
Court has used to differentiate between public and private rights.123 Another 
test is to consider whether the right in question is asserted against the gov-
ernment or against a private individual.124 Absent a waiver of sovereign im-
munity, the government is immune from suit, and therefore no Article III 
questions can arise.125 The government, of course, can and does waive that 
immunity so as to allow citizens to vindicate their rights including by mon-
etary compensation.126 At the same time, when the government does waive 
its immunity, it can condition the waiver on disputes being adjudicated in 
non-Article III tribunals.127 Thus, under traditional view, “the presence of the 
United States as a proper party . . . is a necessary but not sufficient means of 
distinguishing ‘private rights’ from ‘public rights.’”128 In other words, public 
rights are “those which arise between the Government and persons subject 
 
 120.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); see also Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 532 (1985); see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
564 (1972); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970). 
 121.  See supra notes 114–116 and accompanying text. 
 122.  See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law As Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 41 (2012) 
(“Patent litigation historically has been regarded as private law litigation, meaning ‘disputes between 
private parties about private rights.’”) (quoting Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976)); Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson Am., Inc., 864 F.3d 
1309, 1316, 1323–25 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). But see 
MCM Portfolio, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[P]atent rights are 
public rights”). 
 123.  See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 585–89 (rejecting “a bright-line test for determining” the dividing line 
between public and private rights). 
 124.  See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982) (plurality opin-
ion) (“[A] matter of public rights must at a minimum arise ‘between the government and others.’”) (quot-
ing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 
(1932) (“[T]he distinction is at once apparent between cases of private right and those which arise be-
tween the government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the 
constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments. . . . Familiar illustrations of adminis-
trative agencies created for the determination of such matters are found in connection with the exercise 
of the congressional power as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, 
public health, the facilities of the post office, pensions, and payments to veterans.”).  
 125.  Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amena-
ble to the suit of an individual without its consent.”); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933) 
(holding that Hans “applies with equal force to suits against a state and those brought against the United 
States.”). 
 126.  See, e.g., Tucker Act of 1887, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2011). 
 127.  Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 452 (holding that “claimants [against the government] have [no] right to 
sue on [their claims] unless Congress consents; and Congress may attach to its consent such conditions 
as it deems proper, even to requiring that the suits be brought in a legislative court specially created to 
consider them.”). 
 128.  Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 
(1982)).  
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to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional func-
tions of the executive or legislative departments.”129 Under this view, the vast 
majority of patent disputes are indeed disputes over private rights, for they 
are disputes between private parties.130 (There are occasionally infringement 
suits between private parties and the federal government, and those can be 
and are properly assigned to the Court of Federal Claims—an Article I 
court).131 The IPRs are, by every measure, disputes between private parties132 
with the government officials acting only as adjudicators.133 On the tradi-
tional view of the fault line between public and private rights, then, patent 
disputes between private parties fall squarely in the latter camp. 
A third way the courts have differentiated between public and private 
rights is by assigning to the former category those rights that are “closely 
intertwined with a federal regulatory program Congress has power to en-
act”134 and are “so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to 
be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by 
the Article III judiciary.”135 It is not disputable that Congress has the power, 
not an obligation to enact patent laws setting forth the scope, duration, and 
other aspect of patent rights.136 But it does not follow that the grant of patents 
is a regulatory scheme as that term was understood in Granfinanciera and 
Thomas v. Union Carbide. Patent laws are unlike the regulatory schemes for 
selling drugs or pesticides. Those schemes could readily be classified as reg-
ulatory because government deployed quintessential police powers to con-
trol what items enter the market and under what conditions.137 In contrast, 
 
 129.  Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 452 
(1977). 
 130.  See La Belle, supra note 122, at 41; see also Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 65 (concluding that 
only suits that are “between the government and others” implicate “public rights.”). 
 131.  See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 132.  See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012) (allowing “a person who is not the owner of a patent [to] file 
with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.”); id. at § 314(a) (prohibiting 
the PTO Director from instituting an IPR unless a petition has been filed and has met certain threshold 
requirements).  
 133.  Id. at §§ 316(c), 318(a). 
 134.  Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54. 
 135.  Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593 (1985). 
 136.  See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843) (“[T]he powers of Congress to legislate 
upon the subject of patents is plenary . . . and . . . there can be no limitation of their right to modify them 
at their pleasure, so that they do not take away the rights of property in existing patents.”); see also In re 
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958–59 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“It is to be observed that the Constitutional clause under 
consideration neither gave to nor preserved in inventors (or authors) any rights and set no standards for 
the patentability of individual inventions; it merely empowered Congress, if it elected to do so, to secure 
to inventors an ‘exclusive right’ for an unstated ‘limited’ time for the stated purpose of promoting useful 
arts.”). 
 137.  Compare Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 992–93 (1984) (“Monsanto has not 
challenged the ability of the Federal Government to regulate the marketing and use of pesticides. Nor 
could Monsanto successfully make such a challenge, for such restrictions are the burdens we all must 
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the grant of patents is not done pursuant to police powers and does not reg-
ulate the ability of the patentee to place products on the market.138 Instead, it 
grants the patent holder nothing more than a right to exclude others from his 
property,139 questions of patent validity are questions of private party’s abil-
ity to exclude others from his property.140 In this sense, patent laws are no 
different than the Homestead Act where the government had the power to 
transfer property belonging to the United States and to create detailed rules 
for such transfer, but where the rights created following such transfer were 
“private” rights.141 Nor is it different from a trademark—a species of intel-
lectual property that the Court has found to be a private right.142 None of it 
is surprising, as “[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest is the right 
to exclude others. That is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property.’”143 
For the same reason, the oft-advanced argument that patents are public 
rights because they are creatures of a statute is also not convincing. As dis-
cussed in the preceding Part, rights in land are also often traceable to a stat-
utory enactment.144 Indeed, according to the National Park Service, private 
 
bear in exchange for ‘the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community.’” (quoting 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979)), with Leatherman Tool Grp. Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 131 
F.3d 1011, 1014–15 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[W]hile the patent laws provide the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling a claimed invention . . . [they] do not create any affirmative right to make, use, 
or sell anything.”). 
 138.  In fact, both state and federal governments may outright prohibit the sale or possession of pa-
tented devices. See, e.g., Webber v. Va., 103 U.S. 344, 347 (1880); see also Patterson v. Ky., 97 U.S. 
501, 505–09 (1878). 
 139.  See Leatherman Tool, Grp. Inc., 131 F.3d at 1014–15.  
 140.  See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 147 (2013) (“A valid patent excludes all except its 
owner from the use of the protected process or product . . . . But an invalidated patent carries with it no 
such right.”) (emphasis in original; internal citations and quotations omitted). It is this distinction that 
makes IPRs fundamentally different from non-Article III adjudication system approved in Thomas. There, 
the regulatory scheme did not deprive a private party from its right to exclude others from its private 
property. Rather, the government required disclosure of certain data in order to obtain a permit to market 
the pesticides. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007–08. The disclosures were entirely voluntary. Id. To the 
extent those data constituted trade secrets (undoubtedly private property), the right to exclude others was 
“extinguished” by the voluntary disclosure. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584. Thus, once disclosure was made, 
the manufacturer lost the right to exclude. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011–12. The only thing left to the 
manufacturers of pesticides was a right to be compensated for competitors’ use of their data. Thomas, 
473 U.S. at 574–75. This right of compensation is a right wholly apart from the right to exclude. Cf. id. 
at 590 (noting that Congress could have instead of creating an arbitration regime, simply required fees 
for usage of others’ data and then redistributed those fees to the data providers); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 
at 1011 (“With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the 
property interest.”). The only right which Congress assigned to a non-Article III tribunal was the right to 
compensation. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590. 
 141.  See supra notes 62–72 and accompanying text. 
 142.  K–Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185–186 (1988) (“Trademark law, like contract 
law, confers private rights, which are themselves rights of exclusion.”). 
 143.  Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) 
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
 144.  Id. 
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property in 10 percent of all the land in the United States, spread across 30 
states, exists solely by virtue of the Homestead Act.145 Yet, without a doubt, 
the rights in that land are indeed private rights.146 
While the line between private and public rights is no longer as bright 
as it briefly was, both history and the fundamental difference between patents 
and other benefits acquired as part of pervasive regulatory schemes suggest 
that patents belong in the former rather than latter category. 
II. ADJUDICATING PRIVATE RIGHTS 
A. Article III and Private Rights 
Even in cases where the right in question is indisputably “private,” noth-
ing precludes courts from seeking independent expert reports and recom-
mendations.147 Courts often appoint “special masters” to resolve complex 
disputes. Federal judges heavily rely on magistrate judges to supervise liti-
gation between private parties.148 Why can’t then federal courts rely on the 
expertise of the Patent Office to resolve often difficult questions of patent 
validity? The short answer is they can, and probably should,149 but with a 
major caveat. When the courts appoint special masters or employ magistrate 
judges, they retain the power of plenary review of the proposed 
 
 145.  NAT’L PARK SVC., supra note 63. 
 146.  Furthermore, it is not even beyond debate that patent rights stem from the statute rather than 
inhere in the inventor by the virtue of the Constitution itself. As Chief Justices Marshall and Taney wrote, 
the inventor has, from the moment of the invention an inchoate property right which is merely “perfected” 
and “made absolute” by suing out a patent. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 493 (1850) (Taney, C.J.) 
(“[T]he discoverer of a new and useful improvement is vested by law with an inchoate right to its exclu-
sive use, which he may perfect and make absolute by proceeding in the manner which the law requires.”); 
Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (Marshall, Circuit Justice), aff’d, 13 U.S. 199 
(1815). Whether one sides with Taney and Marshall or whether one adopts a more restrictive view of 
patent rights, the important point is that the mere fact that a particular right flows from a statute does not 
ipso facto make that right a “public” one. 
 147.  See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (“In cases of equity and admiralty, it is historic 
practice to call to the assistance of the courts, without the consent of the parties, masters, and commis-
sioners or assessors, to pass upon certain classes of questions, as, for example, to take and state an account 
or to find the amount of damages.”); see also Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 
275, 311 (2010) (noting that courts, though “only occasionally [rely on] special masters and outside ex-
perts.”). 
 148.  United States v. Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 2015) (Higginson, J., dissenting) 
(“As assistants, the federal magistracy is an Article III adjunct body—joining in aid, indispensably and 
even magisterially”); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(“District courts and, occasionally, appellate courts are accustomed to deferring to non-Article III officials 
acting as factfinders. Examples include . . . special masters and magistrates”). 
 149.  See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the Hindsight 
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1463 (2006). 
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recommendations.150 The same is not true when it comes to IPRs.151 This is 
what sets IPRs apart from other non-Article III adjudications, and even pre–
existing reexamination proceedings. 
As is the case with most executive tribunals, a dissatisfied party can 
appeal PTAB’s IPR rulings to federal courts.152 The Supreme Court has pre-
viously held that the right to appeal may satisfy the requirements of Article 
III.153 Thus, in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co. where the 
Court held that initial administrative adjudication of state law issue is per-
missible provided there is review in an Article III court, even if the review is 
very limited in scope.154 Similarly, in Crowell v. Benson, the Court permitted 
an administrative agency to perform fact-finding subject only to judicial re-
view on questions of law.155 Several decades later, in Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, the Court endorsed administrative resolution of 
state law claims (which are usually heard by an Article III court) where such 
resolution was consented to by the parties.156 At first glance, these cases seem 
to support the constitutionality of PTAB. After all, a patent owner maintains 
the right to appeal an unfavorable decision to the Federal Circuit, which re-
views questions of law de novo.157 However, upon a deeper examination, the 
argument fails. 
In all of the cases just discussed, the right at issue was, though a private 
right,158 of a particular nature. It was either a bankruptcy or an admiralty 
right, or, as in Schor, a right that was freely surrendered to the adjudication 
of an Article I tribunal. To put it simply, the nature of the claim matters. 
Admiralty and bankruptcy have long been recognized as different from com-
mon law cases and it is on these grounds that the Supreme Court approved 
 
 150.  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (2012); Thornton v. Jennings, 819 F.2d 153, 154 (6th Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam) (“Article III of the Constitution require that the district court make a de novo review of the mag-
istrate’s report and recommendations); see also Stauble v. Warrob, Inc., 977 F.2d 690, 696 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(holding that “refer[ing] the entire case to a special master for findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
with no boundaries on the master’s authority and no provision for anything remotely resembling de novo 
review.”). 
 151.  See Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“In appeals of Board 
decisions, these factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.”). 
 152.  35 U.S.C. § 329 (2012). In the post-issuance review this right is not fully reciprocal. A patent 
challenger may not appeal an adverse finding unless they would have an independent standing in an 
Article III court (a requirement not imposed in the PTAB proceedings). See Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, 
Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 153.  See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78–79 (1982) (plurality 
opinion) (“[T]his Court has sustained the use of adjunct factfinders even in the adjudication of constitu-
tional rights—so long as those adjuncts were subject to sufficient control by an Art. III district court.”). 
 154.  318 U.S. at 170–71. 
 155.  285 U.S. 22, 51–54 (1932). 
 156.  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986). 
 157.  35 U.S.C. § 329 (2011); see also Corning v. Fast Felt Corp., 873 F.3d 896, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 158.  Bankers Trust, 318 U.S. at 168; Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51; Schor, 478 U.S. at 850. 
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factual dispute resolution before Article I adjudicators.159 Similarly, it is per-
missible to have private parties resolve their claims before whatever body 
they see fit, provided that they agree to do so. And, of course, using adjuncts 
such as special masters or magistrate judges does not undermine the ultimate 
authority of Article III courts to resolve disputes over private rights provided 
that “Article III courts control the [adjunct] system as a whole.”160 In con-
trast, the power to resolve traditional common law disputes cannot be re-
moved from Article III courts (and their “adjuncts.”).161 
Properly viewed then, the Supreme Court’s precedents do not buttress, 
but rather undermine PTAB’s constitutional footing. The judicial supervi-
sion of PTAB is simply insufficient to comport with Article III requirements. 
PTAB “issue[s] final judgments, which are binding and enforceable even in 
the absence of an appeal,”162 and its factual findings are reviewed under the 
“deferential [substantial evidence] standard.”163 Indeed, even questions of 
law are not entirely reviewable on appeal.164 For example, unlike in Crowell, 
where the Court held that the existence of jurisdictional facts triggering the 
administrative adjudicatory process must be subject to plenary review in Ar-
ticle III courts,165 the AIA expressly prohibits judicial review of the PTAB’s 
decision to institute an IPR in the first place.166 Additionally, the courts defer 
to the PTAB’s claim construction standard,167 even though the proper scope 
 
 159.  See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51 (“In cases of equity and admiralty, it is historic practice to call to 
the assistance of the courts, without the consent of the parties, masters, and commissioners or assessors, 
to pass upon certain classes of questions, as, for example, to take and state an account or to find the 
amount of damages.”); Bankers Trust, 318 U.S. at 170 (“[C]ourts of equity, of admiralty and of bank-
ruptcy, by themselves and their mandatories examine and decide disputed questions of fact; and no reason 
is perceived why claims of the sort here involved should not be litigated, as are other claims against 
bankrupt estates, by such machinery and in such manner as Congress shall prescribe, saving to the claim-
ant the right of notice and hearing, and such review as is provided by the statute as we construe it.”). 
 160.  Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 544–46 (9th 
Cir.) (en banc) (Kennedy, J.). 
 161.  See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–503 (2011). 
 162.  Id. at 486–87 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85–86 
(1982) (plurality opinion)).  
 163.  N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 85 (plurality opinion). Indeed, the Federal Circuit upholds 
PTAB’s factual determinations when supported by “substantial evidence,” see Merck & Cie v. Gnosis 
S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015)—a more deferential standard than the review of Bankruptcy 
Judges’ determinations disapproved of in Northern Pipeline and Stern. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 
150, 162–63 (1999).  
 164.  See infra notes 166–168. 
 165.  Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62–65 (1932). 
 166.  35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016). 
But see Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (holding 
that courts can review whether the PTAB complied with the time bar provisions of the statute in its insti-
tution decisions). 
 167.  Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2142–46. 
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of the claim is a question of law.168 The Supreme Court rejected a similar 
scheme concerning bankruptcy judges,169 and there is no good reason to think 
that patent judges are any different. 
B. Reconciling the Private Rights Doctrine with Reexamination 
Inter Partes Review is not the first Congressional attempt to give the 
Patent Office power to take a “second look” at issued patents.170 The first 
such mechanism was adopted in 1980 when Congress created ex parte reex-
amination.171 Without going into great details of the reexamination process, 
suffice it to say, that once a petition for reexamination was granted, “the 
[reexamination] process unfolds just like the original examination of a patent 
application would . . . .” In essence, it would be fair to say that for the pur-
poses of evaluating the continuing patentability of claims subject to reexam-
ination, the issued patent is treated as a mere patent application.172 So the 
question then is whether IPRs are in any meaningful way different from the 
ex parte reexaminations. The answer to that question is “yes.” And they are 
different in a constitutionally significant way. 
In contrasting IPRs with ex parte reexaminations, I shall not retread 
ground that I have covered elsewhere beyond noting that the rights of the 
patentees in IPRs are narrower than in ex parte reexamination.173 More sig-
nificant though, are the avenues of appeal open to a patentee whose patent 
was invalidated in ex parte reexamination. Prior to the America Invents Act, 
an unsatisfied patent owner whose patent was cancelled, had a statutory right 
to either seek review in the Federal Circuit (under the traditional deferential 
review standards),174 or institute a civil action in the U.S. District Court 
 
 168.  See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 842 (2015) (“[t]he ultimate question 
of construction [is] a legal question.”). 
 169.  Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 486 (2011) (“A full majority of Justices in Northern Pipeline 
also rejected the debtor’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional 
because the bankruptcy judge was acting merely as an adjunct of the district court or court of appeals.”). 
 170.  See generally Dolin, supra note 4, at 890–95, 899–909 (discussing the history of “second look” 
proposals and legislation). 
 171.  Id. at 890; Act of December 12, 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act), Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 30, § 302, 94 
Stat. 3015, 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302). 
 172.  Dolin, supra note 4, at 901. 
 173.  See generally id. (discussing differences between IPRs and various forms of reexamination 
proceedings). 
 174.  See 35 U.S.C. § 306 (2002) (“The patent owner involved in a reexamination proceeding . . . 
may seek court review under the provisions of sections 141 to 145 of this title . . . .”). Sections 141 through 
144 govern appeals to the Federal Circuit, while Section 145 allowed “[a]n applicant dissatisfied with the 
decision of the Board [to] have remedy by civil action against the Director in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.” See also In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (reviewing PTO’s decisions on reexamination under the “substantial evidence” stand-
ard).  
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(under a de novo) review standard.175 This ability to seek de novo review is 
what made the old process constitutionally permissible.176 Under such rules, 
the patent judges truly served as mere adjuncts to the Article III judiciary.177 
In 1999, the right of review in District Court was purportedly elimi-
nated.178 Admittedly, the statute allowing such review was not a model of 
clarity (in large part because the terminology was not updated when Con-
gress created ex parte reexamination),179 which in turn allowed the Patent 
Office to interpret it in a restrictive fashion.180 Although a few District Court 
decisions supported the PTO’s statutory interpretation that no District Court 
review of reexamination decisions is available181, it is far from clear that such 
an interpretation is correct.182 In any event, the elimination of the right to 
seek de novo review of a reexamination decision is of much more recent 
vintage than the creation of the reexamination process itself. Thus, the addi-
tion of this procedure to the Patent Act in 1980 tells us nothing about the 
constitutionality of IPRs created in 2012. 
A harder case to distinguish is inter partes reexamination which was 
created in 1999183 and abolished with the passage of the AIA.184 The inter 
partes reexamination was in all respects identical to an ex parte reexamina-
tion (and therefore initial examination) but for the fact that it allowed con-
tinued participation of a third party which requested the proceedings in the 
first place.185 Under the statute that created inter partes reexamination, a dis-
satisfied party was permitted to appeal an unfavorable decision only to the 
 
 175.  In an action under § 145, the review is de novo and introduction of new evidence is permitted. 
See Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 444–46 (2012). 
 176.  See supra notes 150, 153 and accompanying text. 
 177.  The same analysis also applies to the even older procedures for interferences between applica-
tions and already issued patents. A patentee whose claims have been administratively cancelled in an 
interference proceeding had a right to a civil action, with de novo review of the matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 
146.  
 178.  See Charles E. Miller & Daniel P. Archibald, Interpretive Agency-Rulemaking vs. Statutory 
District Court Review-Jurisdiction in Ex Parte Patent Reexaminations, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 498, 500 (2010) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.303(a), (d), and MPEP § 2279). 
 179.  See Sigram Schindler Beteiligungsgesellschaft MBH v. Kappos, 675 F. Supp. 2d 629, 631–33 
(E.D. Va. 2009) (noting tension between relevant statutory provisions governing judicial review). 
 180.  See Miller & Archibald, supra note 178, at 524–29. 
 181.  See, e.g., Power Integrations, Inc. v. Kappos, 6 F. Supp. 3d 11, 20–23 (D.D.C. 2013); see also 
Teles AG v. Kappos, 846 F. Supp. 2d 102, 103 (D.D.C. 2012). But see Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin 
GmbH, 271 F. Supp. 2d 64, 78 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The party that receives an adverse decision from the 
PTO’s pending reexamination is not without redress . . . . When administrative remedies have been ex-
hausted, that party may appeal to either this court or to the Federal Circuit.”) (emphasis added). 
 182.  See generally Miller & Archibald, supra note 178 (arguing that properly read, the pre–AIA 
Patent Act did not bar de novo rDistrict Court review of inter partes reexamination decisions). 
 183. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified in 
relevant part in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2006)) (repealed 2012).  
 184.  Dolin, supra note 4, at 897. 
 185.  See Dolin & Manta, supra 4, at 738. 
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Federal Circuit,186 which in turn reviewed the PTO conclusions under a def-
erential standard.187 In this sense, inter partes reexamination looks no differ-
ent from an IPR. At the same time, differences remain. Most importantly, in 
the reexamination proceedings, the patentee retained an unlimited ability to 
amend claims,188 which is a significant difference from litigation and sets the 
proceedings apart from being simply a substitute for a trial in federal court.189 
In this sense, the proceedings (like ex parte reexamination) were not adjudi-
catory in nature and did not trigger Article III’s strictures.190 More funda-
mentally though, the existence of inter partes reexamination which lasted 
barely more than ten years and resulted in fewer than 500 cases of claim 
cancellation191 is just as likely to be constitutionally suspect itself as to be 
proof of the IPRs’ constitutionality. The fact that no Article III constitutional 
challenges to inter partes reexamination materialized is just as likely to be 
in consequence of the relative unimportance and rarity of the procedure as it 
is to be the result of universal recognition of the procedure’s constitutional-
ity. 
At the end of the day, the IPRs are sufficiently and significantly differ-
ent from their predecessor reexamination proceedings. The powers granted 
to the PTAB by the America Invents Act combined with the lack of mean-
ingful review in an Article III court, is also what sets IPRs apart and makes 
them constitutionally suspect. 
III. WHY ARTICLE III? 
The debate over where to repose adjudicatory authority is not merely an 
academic exercise nor are the objections to the PTAB grounded in adherence 
to supposedly formalistic, but ultimately irrelevant demands that judges have 
life tenure and salary protection. Rather, the objection is grounded in the very 
purposes of Article III itself and the failure and impossibility of the PTAB, 
as presently configured, to live up to those goals. 
 
 186.  35 U.S.C. § 315 (2012). 
 187.  See Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (applying 
“substantial evidence” standard to a review of PTO’s determinations in an inter partes reexamination), 
overruled on other grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 188.  See Dolin & Manta, supra note 4, at 784–85. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46 (2011) (“The Act converts inter partes reexamination 
from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding.”). 
 191.  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 1, (Sept. 30, 
2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2018). There were fewer than 150 cases with claim cancellations prior to the passage of 
the AIA, id. at 6, and fewer than 300 prior to the availability of the IPRs. Id. at 5.  
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A. The Guarantee of a Neutral Adjudicator 
The fundamental purpose of Article III is “to safeguard litigants’ ‘right 
to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination 
by other branches of government.’”192 The federal judiciary accomplishes 
this goal by ensuring that Article III judges have life tenure and salary secu-
rity.193 Once confirmed, a federal judge is entirely independent of the other 
two branches and no amount of Presidential or Congressional fury at any 
particular decision or approach to the law affects that judge’s or a collegial 
court’s authority.194 It is just the opposite with the PTAB. 
The PTAB judges serve as an extension and at the pleasure of the Di-
rector of the Patent and Trademark Office.195 The Director is ultimately re-
sponsible for the decisions of the Board and conversely, the Board makes the 
decisions under the supervision of the Director.196 The Director himself is, 
of course, a political appointee subject to Senate confirmation and serving at 
the pleasure of the President197 (and under the direct supervision of the Sec-
retary of Commerce, who is himself a political appointee).198 This setup 
makes a fundamental difference in the security of the property rights in pa-
tents and neutrality in the adjudication of patent validity. To see why this is 
so, one need look no further than the transition between President Obama’s 
and President Trump’s Administration. 
After President Trump’s inauguration, a number of individuals and 
groups urged him to replace Director Michelle K. Lee with someone of his 
own choosing. The president was lobbied to appoint someone with radically 
different attitude toward IPRs than that espoused by former Director Lee.199 
At the same time, the now-former Director Lee (or at least her policies) have 
 
 192.  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting United 
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)). 
 193.  See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483–84 (2011). 
 194.  See id. at 484. 
 195.  See Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L. J. 470, 496 n.106 (2011) (citing 35 U.S.C. 
§ 6(a) (2006)). 
 196.  See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent Stare 
Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1587–88 (2016). The Director himself is a member of the PTAB and has the 
power to select which other administrative patent judges hear which cases. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012).  
 197.  35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1), (4) (2002). 
 198.  Id. at § 1(a) (The PTO is “an agency . . . within the Department of Commerce.”); § 3(a) (spec-
ifying that the Director of the PTO is also under the Secretary of Commerce).  
 199.  See, e.g., James Edwards, The Bottom Line on Trump’s PTO: Michelle Lee Must Go, 
IPWATCHDOG.COM (Jan. 24, 2017), http://bit.ly/2w8vNEA; see also Gene Quinn, President Trump Must 
Pick a PTO Director Who Believes Patents are Private Property Rights, IPWATCHDOG.COM (June 28, 
2017), http://bit.ly/2w7SKI5.  
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their defenders in both the government and private sector.200 This tug-of-war 
over who should run an important agency is, in and of itself, neither surpris-
ing nor noteworthy. As administrations change, so do policy goals and there-
fore personnel. In this regard, the PTO is no different from any other gov-
ernment agency. What is different though is that the arguments for change 
in the PTO leadership were directly tied to the arguments for change in the 
adjudicatory process in the IPRs. While changes in other agencies happen as 
part of regular rulemaking process, subject to the Administrative Procedure 
Act, apply globally to all those regulated by the relevant agencies, and per-
haps most importantly do not change the scope of private property rights. 
The changes in the leadership of the PTO, on the other hand, can affect pri-
vate property rights in patents, can occur without any rule-making, and can 
apply just to a selection of favored (or disfavored) patents. In other words, 
an installation of a new Director can result in a complete about-face with 
respect to a conclusion of validity (or invalidity) of any given patent simply 
because the political winds have changed. 
It is important to remember that the America Invents Act does not limit 
the number of times the same patent can be subjected to an inter partes re-
view.201 Nor is there a time limit on challenging a patent in an IPR.202 The 
opportunity for multiple reviews has been widely used, and some would say 
abused.203 At the same time, a decision of one PTAB panel does not bind 
another one and surviving one review provides no armor against subsequent 
challenges.204 Given these parameters, it follows that a PTO director (or for 
that matter a president) intent on invalidating a particular patent can continue 
ordering more and more inter partes reviews until the desired outcome is 
achieved. Under this system, a patent that may have survived review (and 
litigation) during one presidential administration could be re-evaluated and 
invalidated as soon as a new president is inaugurated and his choice for the 
PTO Director is confirmed. Such a process can take place not because of any 
 
 200.  See, e.g., Letter from Adobe Systems, Inc. et al. to Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S. (Apr. 
25, 2017), http://bit.ly/2w8cGKX; see also Ashley Gold et al., Lee Staying on as Patent Chief under 
Trump Administration, POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2017), http://politi.co/2w8xGRT.  
 201.  35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012) (limited estoppel provision); see also Cepheid v. Roche Molecular 
Sys., Inc., IPR2015-00881, Paper No. 9, at 2, 5–8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 17, 2015) (instituting inter partes re-
view after previous request by the same challenger was denied). 
 202.  35 U.S.C. § 311(c) (2012) (requiring that IPRs start nine month after patent issuance, but setting 
no deadline for such filings). 
 203.  See, e.g., Dolin, supra note 4, at 939–44. Some patents have been subject to in excess of 125 
separate IPR petitions. Pedram Semeni, Patexia Chart 31: Can Patents Survive Multiple IPR Challenges? 
(Case Study), PATEXIA (Mar. 8, 2017), http://bit.ly/2iGkosG.  
 204.  Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 9), § VI.A (2014) (“Every 
Board opinion is, by default, a routine opinion until it is designated as precedential or informative. . . . A 
routine opinion is not binding authority.”). 
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change in the substantive law, but merely because the political powers wish 
to abrogate a particular patent. The scenario could work in reverse as well. 
For example, in a situation where a patent is invalidated, the President could 
remove the Director and have the new Director order a rehearing of the 
PTAB’s decision which would then result in a contrary result. 
The PTO Director’s ability to affect adjudication of specific patent 
cases is not a mere participant in a law professor’s imagined “parade of hor-
ribles.” Rather, it is a description of actual facts on the ground. Thus, the 
PTO Director has, on more than one occasion, when presented with a panel 
decision of which she disapproved ordered new judges to be added to the 
panel for the sole purpose of getting the PTAB to reach the “right” deci-
sion.205 One might think that such a procedure would be a little different from 
(and therefore no more controversial than) a rehearing en banc in a circuit 
court. But on closer inspection, the two procedures are entirely dissimilar. 
When a Court of Appeals decides to rehear a case en banc, that decision is 
taken by all non-recused judges of that court,206 all of whom later participate 
in deciding the matter,207 and the issued opinion is binding on the whole court 
unless overruled by the Supreme Court or another en banc decision.208 At the 
PTAB, on the other hand, the decision to expand the panel is made unilater-
ally by the Director, the participating judges are those that the Director de-
cides to assign to the task,209 and thus far, none of the expanded panels’ opin-
ions have been designated precedential or even informative.210 Unlike the 
 
 205.  See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., IPR2015–00762, Paper 
No. 12 (P.T.A.B. July 20, 2015) (2–1), rev’d on reh’g by expanded panel by, id., Paper No. 16 (Oct. 16, 
2015) (3–2); see also Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp., IPR2014–00508, Paper Nos. 18, 20 
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 20, 2014) (expanded, five-member panel) (3–2), rev’d on reh’g by, id. Paper Nos. 31, 32 
(Feb. 12, 2015) (further expanded, seven-member panel) (4–3). 
 206.  See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). 
 207.  28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2012). Even in the Ninth Circuit, where the en banc process involves merely 
an “expanded panel” rather than all of the court’s judges, the judges are selected at random, precisely to 
assure fairness to the litigants. See FED. R. APP. P. 35-3 (9th Cir.). 
 208.  See United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218, 233 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 501 
(2017); see alsop Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers 
of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 649 (2017). 
 209.  See 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012) (“Each appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter 
partes review shall be heard by at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, who shall be 
designated by the Director.”); see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1531–32 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated 
on other grounds by Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (“Commissioner [has] the authority to desig-
nate the members of a panel to consider a request for reconsideration of a Board decision. This includes, 
as in this case, the Commissioner designating an expanded panel made up of the members of an original 
panel, other members of the Board, and himself as such, to consider a request for reconsideration of a 
decision rendered by that original panel.”). 
 210.  For a list of PTAB’s precedential opinions, see Precedential Opinions, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/deci-
sions-and-opinions/precedential (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). For a list of informative opinions, see In-
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Courts of Appeal that use the en banc process to decide “question[s] of ex-
ceptional importance,”211 or resolve conflicts in the decisions of the court’s 
panels,212 it appears that the PTAB uses expanded panels for the purpose of 
reaching results favored by the Director in specific cases.213 And if the Di-
rector can order the Board to do that, so too can her bosses—the Secretary 
of Commerce and the President. This is precisely the danger that the protec-
tions of Article III were meant to guard against.214 It is unfathomable that a 
President could order the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit to rehear a case 
en banc simply because he dislikes the outcome. But it is entirely within the 
President’s prerogative to do so when the case is in front of the PTAB. This 
ability almost ensures that “litigants ‘right to have claims decided before 
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of govern-
ment’”215 is anything but safeguarded. 
One might suggest that whatever overstepping of bounds that the PTAB 
has engaged in during the early implementation of the America Invents Act 
can be corrected by further legislation or rulemaking within the PTO. Thus, 
one might concede that “panel stacking” and Director’s nearly unfettered 
ability to order further IPRs are a problem, but that there are already some 
limits on these authorities216 and that if needed, further ones can be imple-
mented. From my perspective, though such additional limits would be wel-
come, they would not address the fundamental problem. True enough, the 
system as it currently exists has some limits. For example, the PTO cannot 
order inter partes reviews on its own and has to await a petition from a chal-
lenger prior to instituting proceedings.217 But it is not as if there is a shortage 
of such challengers, including both competitors and “public interest” organ-
izations.218 So this requirement hardly serves as a limitation on PTO’s ability 
to convert a previous judgment of validity into one of invalidity or vice versa. 
Similarly, while the statutory estoppels provisions and deadlines for seeking 
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IPRs for parties that have been sued for infringement somewhat lessen 
(though without obviating) the opportunity for serial IPR abuse,219 they do 
not address the constitutional concerns with the PTAB’s impartiality. The 
America Invents Act-imposed limits on IPRs are merely statutory com-
mands, and nothing in the logic supporting the constitutionality of the Act 
would require that such limits be maintained. That is to say if adjudication 
of patent validity can be assigned to an Article I tribunal, there is no reason 
to believe that such assignment must be limited to situations where the patent 
challenger is estopped from raising the same arguments in a subsequent pe-
tition or suit and, or, files his petition within only one year from being sued. 
The constitutionality of the current post-issuance review system simply does 
not depend on the statutory provisions limiting the scope or the timing of the 
review.220 For the same reason, any additional limitations on the PTO’s dis-
cretion would not address the constitutional objection. The “purpose of Ar-
ticle III is to insure fairness to all litigants.”221 That guarantee cannot be de-
pendent on mere legislative or executive promises not to put their thumb on 
the scale. An Article I tribunal is fundamentally incapable of providing the 
same safeguards to litigants that are taken for granted in Article III courts. 
B. PTAB, Article III, and the Separation of Powers 
As important as Article III’s role is in protecting impartial adjudication, 
it has another role—safeguarding “the role of the independent judiciary 
within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government.”222 It “serves a 
structural purpose, ‘barring congressional attempts to transfer jurisdiction [to 
non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating’ constitutional 
courts and thereby prevent[ing] ‘the encroachment or aggrandizement of one 
branch at the expense of the other.’”223 Yet, the PTAB’s entire raison d’être 
is to diminish the power of federal judiciary and expand the power of the 
Executive Branch. And that goal has, in many ways, been accomplished. 
The sponsors of the AIA were quite clear as to the purpose of the post-
issuance provisions. Thus, the House Judiciary Committee report that ac-
companied the bill declared that the post-issuance review is meant to “serve 
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as an effective and efficient alternative to often costly and protracted district 
court litigation.”224 In the Senate, one of the AIA’s chief sponsors declared 
that “[t]here really is no sense in allowing expensive litigation over patents 
that are no longer valid.”225 The legislative history of the Act is replete with 
statements evincing the desire to increase the powers of the PTO and de-
crease those of the federal judiciary in resolving patent disputes.226 And the 
sponsors were successful on at least two levels. 
First, as one commentator noted, PTAB’s “final written decisions in-
validating [patent] claims [have] come to replace summary judgment and 
post-trial decisions” rendered by Article III courts.227 The federal courts fa-
cilitated this takeover by overwhelmingly staying co-pending litigation 
pending PTO review.228 This is not surprising as there is little reason to ex-
pend time and labor on a case that may disappear once the PTO issues its 
final decision. As a result, federal courts have been essentially deprived of 
their responsibility for adjudicating patent cases and determining the scope 
of these property rights, while the role of the Executive Branch has been 
correspondingly enlarged. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the PTAB has made judges (and 
even Supreme Court justices) mere adjuncts and advisors to the PTO.229 The 
opinions and judgments of Article III courts with respect to any given patent 
are never settled and never final, because the PTO can always (applying 
lower level of proof and a broader claim construction) cancel the patent in 
inter partes review regardless of its success in front of any number of federal 
judges.230 Thus, a patentee may file a suit for infringement, win it, obtain 
either an injunction or ongoing royalty payment, win an appeal at the Federal 
Circuit, and have that decision affirmed by the Supreme Court, only to see 
the PTO invalidate the very same patent on the very same evidence,231 which 
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in turn would abrogate infringer’s duty to comply with the duties imposed 
by judicial decree.232 In essence, the PTAB makes final “judgment[s] . . . in-
operative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy.”233 
Judicial determination of patent validity is now too often “merely an opinion, 
which . . . remain[s] a dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights 
of the parties, unless”234 reaffirmed by the PTAB during an inter partes re-
view. As the Supreme Court said over 200 years ago, “[s]uch revision and 
control [of judicial decisions is] radically inconsistent with the independence 
of that judicial power which is vested in the courts.”235 This observation 
ought to remain true even after the rise and maturation of the administrative 
state. 
IV. THE PATH FORWARD 
The AIA created post-issuance proceedings with three goals in mind: 
“to decrease the cost of patent litigation, reduce the number of ‘dubious’ or 
improperly granted patents, and increase the certainty of patent rights.”236 As 
I have argued elsewhere, thus far, the reforms failed to accomplish any of 
these goals, and likely exacerbated some problems.237 In light of that failure 
and of constitutional infirmities discussed, one solution is simply abrogating 
post-issuance review. But one need not throw out the baby with the bath-
water in order to address the constitutional challenges or to achieve Con-
gress’ goals. Nor does one need to forego the obvious expertise that the Pa-
tent Office has in patent matters. But in order to comply with the 
Constitution, one must render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s. A system 
where the ultimate power to adjudicate patent validity resides, as it always 
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has, in Article III courts, but where that power is exercised with reference to 
the opinions of experts would be entirely permissible and perhaps laudable. 
There are several options to accomplish the above goal. First, Congress 
could restore de novo review of PTAB’s decision by civil action as had been 
the case until 1999 with respect to all PTO’s decisions.238 Alternatively, Con-
gress could limit availabilities of IPRs to those parties that have been sued 
for infringement. Under such a system, the District Court would, on either 
party’s motion, refer the matter to the Patent Office for its report and recom-
mendation, much like it refers various matters to magistrate judges.239 An 
unsatisfied party would then be able to note exceptions to the PTAB’s rec-
ommendations with the final decision resting with the District Court.240 An 
added benefit of this system is that it would require the PTO to harmonize 
its claim construction standards with those applicable in court, which would 
in turn ensure consistency in the meaning of the claims both across various 
fora and across different stages of litigation (i.e., validity and infringement). 
With the courts maintaining ultimate control over the dispute, both the rights 
of the litigants to an impartial adjudicator would be protected and the Judi-
ciary’s power would not be diminished by the Executive’s actions.241 
Furthermore, reforms are needed to ensure that judicial decrees are in-
deed final and not subject to revision by later PTO actions.242 Whether by 
limiting PTO’s ability to institute an IPR for a patent which had survived 
litigation through the appeal to the Federal Circuit or by making clear that 
later cancellation of claims does not affect an earlier final judgment with 
respect to an adjudged infringer, Congress must make sure that judicial de-
crees do not become little more than a starting point for future bargaining 
over the fully adjudicated rights. 
As a final matter, I should note that not all post-issuance review pro-
cesses may need to be seriously reformed, for not all of them suffer from the 
same infirmity. Post Grant Reviews (“PGRs”)243 are, in my view, fundamen-
tally different from IPRs in a way which makes them stand on a more solid 
constitutional footing and which may yet allow them to provide significant 
benefits to the system. The most important difference between PGRs and 
IPRs is the fact that the former is limited to the first nine months of a patent’s 
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life.244 The short time frame of availability of this procedure not only guards 
against various abusive processes, but may also be of a constitutional signif-
icance. The Supreme Court has previously addressed a similar system where 
land patents were concerned.245 Under the law at the time, the decision on 
whether to grant a land patent was made by local registers and receivers, but 
an appeal could be had to the Commissioner of the General Land-Office and 
from there to the Secretary of the Interior.246 The land patent was not final 
until the Secretary of the Interior rendered his decision or the time for filing 
an appeal had expired.247 However, once that point was reached and 
 
[T]he patent issued under the seal of the United States, and 
signed by the President, is delivered to and accepted by the 
party, the title of the government passe[d] with this delivery. 
With the title passe[d] away all authority or control of the 
Executive Department over the land, and over the title which 
it has conveyed.248 
 
In this sense, for at least some time, the rights an individual would re-
ceive under a land patent would be provisional and pending the decision of 
the Secretary of the Interior or the expiration of time to seek such a decision. 
At the same time, “one officer of the land office [was] not competent to can-
cel or annul the act of his predecessor. That [was viewed as] a judicial act, 
and require[d] the judgment of a court.”249 
By analogy then, an invention patent could be viewed as “subject to an 
appeal to the” PTO Director, provided such appeal is taken in time. If it is, 
then the Director’s judgment would be final (other than through judicial re-
view), but if it is not, or if the Director affirms the initial grant, then the 
authority of the Executive Branch over the matter would come to an end. The 
constitutional standing of the PGR would be further enhanced if Congress 
were to provide a right for a civil action to challenge patent cancellation in 
that proceeding. Indeed, it makes little sense to allow an unsuccessful appli-
cant to obtain District Court review of the PTO’s denial of the patent, though 
that denial be finalized in a decision of the PTAB,250 but prohibit such review 
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to a previously successful applicant whose patent was quickly abrogated by 
a decision of the very same tribunal.251 PGRs, if properly done, have a po-
tential to truly enhance the patent system by making sure that at least some 
granting decisions are not made ex parte and on a limited record.252 This 
would serve the Congressional goal of reducing the number of improperly 
issued patents, and also strengthen those patents that survive the review, 
which should, at least theoretically, lower the likelihood, and therefore the 
cost of litigation.253 
CONCLUSION 
While the concern over spiraling cost of litigation in general, and patent 
litigation in particular is understandable, and although the desire to improve 
and strengthen the patent system is admirable, the solutions chosen by Con-
gress to address these issues must be constitutional. Treating issued patents 
as equivalent to other statutorily created rights is inconsistent with both the 
history and nature of patents as well as Supreme Court precedents stretching 
back over a century and a half. The America Invents Act failed to heed the 
constitutional strictures in creating the Patent Trials and Appeals Board. The 
result was not just bad policy perpetrated by a “patent death squad,” but a 
system where the validity of patents is dependent on the executive branch’s 
favor and benevolence towards patents and patentees. This system not only 
fails to achieve the goals of AIA’s drafters of creating stronger and more 
secure patent rights,254 but undermines the very foundation of the tripartite 
system of government. At the same time, the system is not unsalvageable. 
Congress can and should improve it in ways that restore the proper balance 
between the Executive and the Judiciary branches, and also provide patent-
ees and challengers with confidence in their respective rights in the adjudi-
cator of those rights. Congress may wish to consider a number of changes to 
the system so as to avoid various abuses, but in order to restore patents to 
their rightful place and to protect our tripartite system of government, Con-
gress must, at the very least, reestablish the courts’ ability for a de novo re-
view of decisions regarding validity of an issued patent and preserve the in-
violability of final judicial decrees. 
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